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Curiosity	and	Pleasure	
	
Michael	S.	Brady			It	is	a	commonplace	that	natural	or	intellectual	curiosity	is	valuable:	it	is	encouraged	in	children,	esteemed	in	scientists,	protected	in	academia.	But	how	might	we	understand	this	value	that	curiosity	is	thought	to	have?	On	one	view,	this	will	depend	upon	the	kind	of	thing	curiosity	is;	and	there	are	good	reasons	to	suppose	that	curiosity	is	an	emotional	response	that	is	in	some	sense	directed	towards	the	truth.	This	view,	however,	runs	into	a	serious	problem.	For	emotions	are,	by	and	large,	held	to	be	valuable	because	they	facilitate	an	appropriate	response	to	certain	kinds	of	important	situations,	objects,	and	events.	Thus	fear	helps	us	to	respond	appropriately	to	danger,	anger	to	insult,	love	to	the	need	for	commitment,	joy	to	unexpected	benefits,	grief	to	loss.	On	this	view	emotions	have	value	because	they	serve	vital	needs	and	help	us	to	accomplish	important	goals.	But	it	is	difficult	to	understand	the	value	of	disinterested	curiosity	along	these	lines.	For	curiosity	doesn’t	seem	to	be	directed	to	anything	of	particular	importance	or	significance.	Indeed,	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	the	questions	or	subjects	that	trigger	curiosity	are	not	themselves	ones	that	it	is	intrinsically	valuable	for	us	to	answer	or	understand,	or	ones	the	truth	about	which	constitutes	an	important	or	significant	goal.	If	so,	we	might	wonder	whether	curiosity	ought	to	be	regarded	as	valuable.	It	turns	out	that	an	examination	of	the	nature	of	curiosity	reveals	that	it	might	lack	the	kind	of	value	that	it	is	traditionally	thought	to	have.		
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In	this	paper	I	want	to	address	this	problem,	and	attempt	to	respond	by	invoking	an	analogy	between	curiosity	and	pleasure.	An	examination	of	the	nature	of	pleasure	suggests	that	it	too	consists	in	a	desire	for	something	that	it	is	not,	in	itself,	intrinsically	valuable,	and	the	achievement	of	which	does	not,	by	itself,	constitute	an	important	goal.	Nevertheless,	pleasure	is	(rightly)	regarded	as	intrinsically	valuable,	and	the	desires	that	partly	constitute	pleasure	are	ones	that	it	makes	sense	for	us	to	have.	And	what	is	true	of	pleasure	is	also	true	of	curiosity	–	or	so,	at	least,	I	want	to	argue.	In	the	first	section	I’ll	examine	the	nature	of	curiosity,	and	make	the	case	that	it	is	best	understood	as	an	emotional	response	with	a	particular	pattern	of	appraisal	or	evaluation	In	the	second	section	I’ll	explain	how	this	generates	a	problem	for	thinking	that	curiosity	is	valuable.	And	in	the	final	section	I’ll	examine	the	analogy	with	pleasure,	with	the	aim	of	resolving	this	problem.	There	is,	I	conclude,	no	tension	between	the	nature	of	curiosity	and	the	idea	that	curiosity	is	intrinsically	valuable.					 1.		What	is	curiosity?	To	begin	it	will	be	helpful	to	delineate	the	kind	of	curiosity	I’m	concerned	with.	We	are	sometimes	curious	about	things	as	a	result	of	practical	interests	and	concerns.	Thus	I’m	curious	as	to	who	was	offered	the	job,	as	it’s	of	practical	importance	to	me	who	my	new	colleague	will	be.	Or	I’m	curious	as	to	the	details	of	who	kissed	whom	last	night,	given	my	desire	for	salacious	gossip.	However,	it	is	also	clear	that	we	are	sometimes	interested	in	certain	questions	but	not	because	the	truth	of	about	such	things	is	a	means	to	some	further	end	that	we	have.	Instead,	we	sometimes	engage	in	what	Jonathan	Kvanvig	calls	
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“inquiry	for	its	own	sake”,	or	pursue	what	Stephen	Grimm	terms	“a	purely	
epistemic	or	intellectual	interest	in	finding	the	truth.”1	Inquiry	for	its	own	sake	aims	at	the	truth,	but	not	for	any	ulterior	purpose	or	concern;	we	simply	want	to	know	the	answer	to	a	question	for	the	sake	of	knowing	that	answer.2	Whereas	the	first	kind	of	interest	is	generated	by	our	practical	concerns,	an	interest	in	truth	for	its	own	sake	seems	to	reflect	our	natural	interest	or	intellectual	curiosity.	Thus,	Carl	Hempel	maintains	that	inquiry	follows	on	from	“sheer	intellectual	curiosity,	[from	our]	deep	and	persistent	desire	to	know	and	to	understand	[ourselves]	and	[our]	world.”3	And	Alvin	Goldman	writes	that	“Our	interest	in	information	has	two	sources:	curiosity	and	practical	concerns.	The	dinosaur	extinction	fascinates	us,	although	knowing	its	cause	would	have	no	material	impact	on	our	lives.”4	Grimm	comments:	“According	to	both	Hempel	and	Goldman	…	it	seems	that	the	reason	why	we	desire	truth	for	its	own	sake,	and	quite	apart	from	our	practical	goals,	can	be	traced	to	the	fact	that	we	are	naturally	curious	beings.	Even	when	nothing	of	practical	importance	seems	to	ride	on	finding	out	how	things	stand	with	respect	to	a	certain	subject,	given	our	natural	curiosity	we	simply	have	a	natural	interest	in	finding	out	how	they	do	stand.”5	In	what	follows	I’ll	be	concerned	with	natural	or	intellectual	curiosity,	which	involve	a	desire	for	truth	its	own	sake,	and	moves	people	to	understand	just	for	the	sake	of	understanding.	Let	us	consider	the	nature	of	this	kind	of	curiosity	in	more	detail.	
																																																								1	Kvanvig	(2003),	p.	54.	Grimm	(2008),	p.	726.		2	See	Lynch,	(2004),	p.	502.	3	Hempel	(1965),	p.	333.		4	Goldman	(1999),	p.	3		5	Grimm	(2008),	p.	727.	
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There	is	considerable	evidence	that	curiosity	is	an	emotion,	rather	than	some	non-emotional	motivational	state	or	trait.	In	particular,	curiosity	would	seem	to	share	many	of	the	‘components’	or	‘elements’	that	are	standardly	used	to	characterize	emotions,	and	that	are	standardly	present	in	paradigmatic	emotional	experience.6	These	include	facial	expression,	feeling,	cognitive	changes,	and	distinctive	pattern	of	appraisal.	Let	us	take	these	in	turn.	(i)	There	are	distinctive	facial	expressions	that	seem	related	to	curiosity.	We	can	usually	recognize	when	people	are	curious	about	and	interested	in	what	we	are	saying	or	about	their	environment,	and	can	quickly	recognize	when	people	are	bored.	Empirical	support	comes	from	a	wide	variety	of	experiments,	including	studies	where	parents	can	recognize	interest,	surprise	and	boredom	on	the	faces	of	their	young	children	when	the	children	(and	the	children	alone)	are	presented	with	a	variety	of	objects.	There	also	seem	to	be	distinctive	vocal	expressions	of	interest	and	boredom.	(ii)	Curiosity	has	a	distinctive	feeling	or	affective	element.	Carroll	Izard	writes:	“At	the	experiential	level	interest	…	is	the	feeling	of	being	engaged,	caught-up	…	There	is	a	feeling	of	wanting	to	investigate,	become	involved,	or	extend	or	expand	the	self	by	incorporating	new	information	…	In	intense	interest	or	excitement	the	person	feels	animated	and	enlivened	…	Even	when	relatively	immobile	the	interested	or	excited	person	has	the	feeling	that	he	is	“alive	and	active.”’7	(iii)	Curiosity,	like	other	emotions,	involves	cognitive	changes,	such	as	changes	to	attention:	is	seems	obvious	that	when	we	are	curious	our	attention	is	fixed	or	focused	on	the	relevant	object	or	event.	There	is,	moreover,	coherence	between	these	components:	distinctive	facial	expressions	typically	occur	at	the																																																									6	Many	contemporary	philosophers	and	psychologists	regard	emotions	as	clusters	of	components.	For	more	on	this,	see	Prinz	(2004),	Ch.	1.	7	Izard	(1977),	p.	216.	
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same	time	as	distinctive	vocal	expressions	and	subjective	feelings.	(iv)	Curiosity	involves	a	certain	pattern	of	evaluation	or	appraisal,	or	a	certain	‘core	relational	theme’,	which	represents	what	the	emotion	is	about,	and	distinguishes	curiosity	from	other	emotions.	Since	the	nature	of	the	appraisal	involved	in	curiosity	is	important,	let	us	look	at	this	in	more	detail.	To	do	so,	I’ll	focus	on	recent	work	by	the	Paul	Silvia	in	his	excellent	book	Exploring	the	Psychology	of	Interest.8			It	has	long	been	thought	–	by	psychologists,	at	any	rate	–	that	there	are	a	number	of	collative	variables	that	generate	curiosity;	these	can	be	regarded	as	forms	of	appraisal	that	determine	what	the	core	relational	theme	of	curiosity	is.	One	of	the	central	appraisals	is	of	novelty:	“whether	or	not	an	event	is	new,	sudden,	or	unfamiliar.	For	interest,	this	novelty	check	includes	whether	people	judge	something	as	new,	ambiguous,	complex,	obscure,	uncertain,	mysterious,	contradictory,	unexpected,	or	otherwise	not	understood.”9	As	Silvia	notes,	this	idea	is	grounded	in	the	traditional	account	of	‘collative	variables’	proposed	by	Daniel	Berlyne.	According	to	Berlyne,	the	appraisals	which	are	constitutive	of	interest	are	appraisals	of	complexity,	novelty,	uncertainty,	and	conflict.	Complexity	“refers	to	the	amount	of	variety	or	diversity	in	a	stimulus	pattern.”10	Novelty	refers	to	objects	that	have	not	been	experienced	before,	and	which	fall	outside	of	the	subject’s	existing	categorizations.11	Uncertainty	is	a	term	used	in	information	theory.	According	to	Berlyne,	“A	certain	degree	of	uncertainty	is	said	to	exist	when	(1)	any	number	of	alternative	events	can	occur,	(2)	there	is	no	knowing	in	advance	which	will	occur	at	a	particular	time,	and	(3)	each	
																																																								8	Silvia	(2006).	9	Silvia	(2006),	p.	24.	10	Berlyne	(1960),	p.	38.	11	Silvia	(2006),	p.	34.	
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alternative	occurs	with	a	specifiable	relative	frequency	or	probability.”12	Finally,	Berlyne	explains	conflict	as	follows:	“when	two	or	more	incompatible	responses	are	aroused	simultaneously	in	an	organism,	we	shall	say	that	the	organism	is	in	
conflict.”13	Silvia	comments:	“A	common	form	of	conflict	is	receiving	information	that	differs	from	existing	information,	such	as	expectancy	violation,	or	perceiving	incongruent	parts	within	a	whole	object.	Stimuli	can	also	arouse	conflict	by	implying	different	and	incompatible	categorizations.”14	More	recently,	Silvia	has	proposed	that	there	is	another	appraisal	involved	in	interest	or	curiosity,	namely	an	appraisal	of	‘coping	potential.’	He	writes:	“Coping	potential	refers	broadly	to	estimates	of	resources,	power,	abilities,	and	control	in	relation	to	an	event.	Judgements	of	coping	potential	appear	in	the	appraisal	structures	of	many	emotions.	For	interest,	coping	potential	probably	refers	to	people’s	appraisals	of	whether	they	can	understand	the	ambiguous	event.	Upon	appraising	something	as	unfamiliar,	complex,	and	ambiguous,	people	probably	appraise	the	likelihood	that	the	poorly	understood	event	will	become	coherent	and	clear.”15	For	Silvia,	then,	curiosity	or	interest	involves	two	appraisal	components:	an	appraisal	of	novelty,	broadly	construed,	and	an	appraisal	of	one’s	capacity	to	understand	or	comprehend	the	new	object,	event	or	topic.16		There	is	considerable	evidence	for	this	view	of	curiosity’s	core	relational	theme,	from	both	the	armchair	and	the	laboratory.	Although	we	tend	to	find	old,																																																									12	Berlyne	(1965),	p.	31.	13	Berlyne	(1960),	p.	10.		14	Silvia	(2006),	p.	36.	15	Op.	cit.	p.	57.	16	Silvia	notes	that	“[s]ome	appraisal	theories	synthesize	the	set	of	components	into	an	abstract	theme	(Lazarus,	2001).	The	events	that	people	find	interesting	can	probably	be	described	thematically	as	events	that	are	not	understood	but	understandable.”	p.	58.	
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expected,	familiar	and	straightforward	things	comfortable	or	enjoyable,	and	are	for	this	reason	attracted	to	such	features,	this	attraction	does	not	seem	to	amount	to	curiosity.	We	are,	instead,	curious	about	things	which	are	unexpected,	unfamiliar,	and	often	uncomfortable:	we	are	intrigued	by	the	mysterious,	the	baffling,	the	peculiar,	and	the	unexplained.	This	is	often	apparent	in	our	reactions	to	the	arts.	Although	we	might	enjoy	seeing	a	good	film	for	a	second	or	third	time,	we	are	not	curious	about	or	interested	in	seeing	how	the	story	develops	after	the	first	showing;	rather,	curiosity	or	interest	is	generated	by	new	films,	which	promise	uncertainty	and	unpredictability.	For	this	reason,	we	tend	to	lose	interest	in	seeing	a	film	if	the	plot	or	ending	is	revealed	beforehand,	despite	being	confident	that	the	cinematic	experience	would	nevertheless	be	enjoyable.	Something	similar	can	be	said	about	other	people:	we	are	often	comfortable	in	the	company	of	those	with	whom	we	are	most	familiar,	but	curious	about	the	life	of	the	intriguing	stranger	we	meet	in	the	pub	or	on	the	train.	The	same	is	true	of	topics	and	questions:	it	is	puzzles	or	anomalies	–	of	consciousness	in	a	physical	universe,	of	free	will	in	deterministic	creatures,	of	normativity	arising	from	non-normative	features	–	that	engage	philosophical	curiosity	and	interest.		By	the	same	token,	our	interest	would	seem	to	vary	with	our	capacity	to	understand	or	comprehend	events	or	materials.	We	quickly	lose	interest	if	it	becomes	obvious	that	we’re	unable	to	understand	some	topic	or	subject	–	think	of	the	most	common	reaction	of	readers	to	Stephen	Hawking’s	A	Brief	History	of	
Time	–	whilst	our	curiosity	is	often	piqued	or	increased	by	the	fact	that	some	truth	or	understanding	is	within	our	grasp.	Consider	how	one’s	interest	is	captured	and	consumed	in	the	moments	leading	up	to	the	fictional	unmasking	of	
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the	murderer,	or	just	prior	to	the	revealing	of	the	winner	of	the	reality	tv	show.17	Common-sense	reflection	on	our	own	experience	provides	evidence	for	the	claim	that	we	tend	to	be	curious	about	novel,	complex,	unexpected	events	that	hold	out	the	potential	for	understanding,	and	tend	to	be	bored	by	old,	familiar,	predictable	or	incomprehensible	things.		There	is	also	empirical	evidence	for	this	take	on	the	appraisal	structure	of	interest.	Many	studies	show	that	“people	tend	to	find	complex	things	interesting	and	simple	things	enjoyable.	In	some	experiments,	people	ranked	randomly	generated	polygons	according	to	how	interesting	and	how	enjoyable	they	found	each	polygon.	The	complex	polygons	were	the	most	interesting;	the	simplest	polygons	were	the	most	enjoyable	…	The	diverging	effect	of	complexity	on	interest	and	enjoyment	appears	for	studies	of	anagrams…,	randomly	generated	melodies…,	and	videos...	Like	complexity,	novelty	has	diverging	effects	on	interest	and	enjoyment.	Familiar	things	tend	to	be	enjoyable,	whereas	new	things	tend	to	be	interesting.	Research	on	mere	exposure	has	demonstrated	this	many	times….while	increasing	liking,	repetition	reduces	interest	–	things	become	less	interesting	with	more	repetitions.”18	Experiments	with	literature	also	bear	this	out:	in	one	study,	“people	were	interested	in	stories	with	high	uncertainty	(e.g.,	a	surprise	ending)	that	was	eventually	reduced;	it	didn’t	matter	whether	the	story	had	a	happy	or	sad	ending.	In	contrast,	people	enjoyed	stories	that	had	happy	endings	regardless	of	the	story’s	uncertainty.”19	
																																																								17	Silvia	writes:	“An	initially	interesting	movie,	for	example,	can	become	uninteresting	when	the	viewers	feel	unable	to	form	a	coherent	understanding	of	the	narrative.	Conversely,	a	confusing	text	can	become	interesting	if	its	hidden	meaning	is	revealed.”	(58)	18	Silvia	(2006),	pp.	25-6.	19	Ibid.	
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Similarly,	studies	show	that	interest	varies	with	appraisals	of	coping	potential.	For	instance,	experts	in	art	and	music	rate	their	capacity	to	understand	their	relative	fields	highly,	and	are	more	interested	in	complex	images	(such	as	those	in	abstract	art)	and	melodies	than	novices	in	art	and	music.	A	similar	pattern	is	found	when	comparing	what	adults	and	children	find	interesting.	Silvia	writes	that	“[t]hese	findings	fit	the	hypothesis	that	the	appraisal	structure	of	interest	involves	appraisals	of	coping	potential.	Experts	relative	to	novices,	and	adults	relative	to	children,	should	have	higher	appraised	ability	to	understand	art	and	music.”20	By	the	same	token,	studies	in	aesthetics	show	that	providing	meaningful	information	(such	as	a	biographical	sketch	of	the	artist	or	what	the	artist	said	about	the	work)	increases	curiosity;	it	is	plausible	to	assume	that	it	does	so,	at	least	in	part,	because	it	makes	the	artwork	more	understandable	to	the	viewer.21	A	recent	set	of	experiments	conducted	by	Silvia	indicated	that	increases	in	appraised	ability	to	understand	complex	art	corresponds	to	picking	more	complex	polygons	as	the	most	interesting	from	a	range	of	shapes.22	Other	experiments	indicate	that	interest	in	works	of	modern	visual	art	depends	“on	both	complexity	and	coping	potential	…	[f]or	complex	pictures	…	ability	strongly	predicted	interest	–	interest	increased	as	appraised	ability	increased.”23	If	this	is	correct,	then	we	can	conclude	that	there	is	good	empirical	evidence	to	support	an	appraisal	theory	of	interest	or	curiosity,	along	the	(broad)	dimensions	of	novelty	and	coping	potential.		
																																																								20	p.	59.	21	Ibid.			22	Ibid.	23	p.	61.	
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2.		Suppose	that	the	above	account	of	curiosity	as	an	emotion	is	correct.	It	seems	to	me	that	this	highlights	a	significant	problem	for	the	common-sense	view	that	curiosity	is	intrinsically	valuable,	and	that	an	intellectual	desire	to	know	is	something	to	be	esteemed.	Unlike	other	emotions,	curiosity	doesn’t	seem	to	be	directed	at	a	situation,	object,	or	event	that	is	of	importance	or	significance,	and	hence	that	calls	for	a	particular	response.	We	all	face	dangers	or	threats,	and	so	all	have	a	need	to	respond	appropriately	to	them:	this	is	why	fear	is	valuable	for	us.	We	all	face	situations	where	we	are	disrespected,	where	we	fail	to	meet	group	standards,	where	we	have	to	rely	on	others,	where	our	expectations	are	violated:	this	is	why	anger,	shame,	trust,	and	disappointment	are	valuable	for	us.	But	curiosity	doesn’t	seem	to	be	related	to	any	particular	value.	We	are	naturally	or	intellectually	curious	about	these	subjects	or	those	topics;	but	what	importance	or	significance	attaches	to	our	knowing	about	or	understanding	these	subjects	or	topics?	Indeed,	what	importance	or	significance	attaches	to	our	knowing	
anything	for	its	own	sake	–	as	opposed	to	knowing	things	for	the	sake	of	the	other	things	that	such	knowledge	can	help	to	bring	about?		To	see	the	worry	here,	consider	again	the	appraisal	variables	that	are	characteristic	of	curiosity.	If	the	above	is	correct,	we	are	motivated	to	understand	subjects	and	answer	questions	that	are	novel,	complex,	ambiguous,	obscure,	mysterious	–	that	violate	expectations,	that	conflict	with	information	we	already	have.	But	what	is	the	intrinsic	value	of	understanding	the	new,	the	complex,	the	obscure,	the	mysterious?	What	is	so	important	about	these	things	that	we	need	an	emotional	response	to	enable	us	to	cope	with	them,	to	register	
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such	things	when	they	occur	in	our	environment,	to	motivate	us	to	deal	appropriately	with	them	by	understanding	them	if	we	can?	These	are	difficult	questions	to	answer,	as	evidenced	by	the	puzzle	people	experience	if	asked	to	explain	why	they	are	curious	about	or	interested	in	something.	When	asked	such	questions,	our	tendency	is	to	say	‘I	don’t	know,	I’m	just	curious’	about	the	object	or	event,	topic	or	question.	In	other	words,	when	curious	we	just	want	to	discover	the	truth,	to	understand,	but	are	hard-pressed	to	offer	much	in	the	way	of	a	reason	or	value	to	which	our	curiosity	and	interest	is	a	response.	In	so	far	as	curiosity	involves	a	desire	to	know	the	truth	for	its	own	sake,	the	curious	cannot	point	to	any	extrinsic	benefit	that	understanding	in	such	cases	would	bring.	[cf.	case	with	pleasure:	the	extrinsic	benefit	isn’t	foremost	in	our	minds.]	But	in	so	far	as	curiosity	varies	according	to	novelty	and	coping	potential,	we	can	doubt	that	there	is	anything	particular	valuable	about	the	subjects	and	questions	that	generate	curiosity,	or	any	features	of	such	subjects	and	questions	that	give	us	good	reason	to	be	curious,	that	warrant	or	make	appropriate	our	intellectual	emotion.	The	puzzling,	the	complex,	the	obscure,	the	ambiguous,	even	the	novel,	would	all	fail	to	appear	on	any	plausible	list	of	intrinsic	goods,	or	of	things	that	contribute	to	human	flourishing,	or	as	elements	of	the	good	life	for	humans	to	live.	So	why,	again,	is	it	rational	or	appropriate	or	valuable	for	us	to	be	curious	about,	and	seek	to	understand,	such	things?	Why	is	natural	or	intellectual	curiosity	held	in	such	high	esteem?		We	might	make	this	argument	in	slightly	different	terms.	It	is	striking	that	there	is	a	great	diversity	in	the	kinds	of	objects	and	events,	topics	and	questions,	that	people	are	curious	about,	or	that	people	find	interesting.	Moreover,	in	very	many	cases,	we	don’t	regard	divergence	in	opinion	on	what	is	interesting	or	an	
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appropriate	object	of	curiosity	as	marking	a	difference	in	reasonableness	or	rationality.	The	fact	that	you	are	curious	about	land	reform	in	12th	century	Wales	whilst	I’m	bored	to	tears	by	the	topic	doesn’t	suggest	that	either	you	or	I	are	rationally	criticizable	for	our	attitudes.	Similarly,	the	fact	that	I	am	curious	to	discover	whether	the	underground	system	in	Paris	is	more	extensive	than	the	one	in	London,	while	you	couldn’t	care	less	about	this,	doesn’t	imply	that	I	am	right	to	be	so	curious	and	you	are	wrong	to	find	this	of	any	interest.	In	these	and	very	many	other	cases	it	is	difficult	to	motivate	or	justify	the	thought	that	curiosity	is	made	rationally	appropriate	or	is	rationally	warranted	by	certain	subjects	or	questions,	such	that	lack	of	curiosity	about	these	questions	is	a	rational	failing.	The	thought	that	certain	topics	and	events	are	ones	that	we	ought	to	be	curious	about	is,	on	the	face	of	it,	difficult	to	defend.	But	if	so,	why	is	natural	or	intellectual	curiosity	so	highly	valued?	Why	praise	someone	for	having	a	response	if	that	response	is	so	ungrounded	in	value,	and	so	rationally	optional?		There	is,	of	course,	a	rather	obvious	response	to	be	made	at	this	point.	We	might	claim	that	curiosity	has	value	insofar	as	it	tracks	or	is	a	response	to	
intrinsically	significant	or	important	truths.	On	this	account,	it	is	the	intrinsic	value	of	certain	truths	that	warrants	the	emotion	and	justifies	the	praise	we	bestow	on	those	who	have	it.	But	not	all	who	are	curious	are	curious	about	such	intrinsically	important	truths,	in	which	case	we	should	qualify	our	praise	accordingly.	Just	as	we	don’t	esteem	those	who	are	afraid	of	what	is	harmless	or	those	who	are	shamed	about	what	isn’t	shameful,	so	too	we	shouldn’t	praise	and	esteem	those	who	are	curious	about	truths	that	lack	intrinsic	importance	or	significance.	If	someone	is	interested	in	the	latter,	then	this	is	indeed	a	rational	failing,	and	one	for	which	they	are	subject	to	rational	criticism.		
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However,	this	response	is	unconvincing.	For	there	is	empirical	evidence	of	(widespread)	divergence	between	what	we	are	curious	about	or	interested	in	and	what	we	find	important	or	significant.	In	other	words,	there	is	significant	divergence	between	what	human	beings	are	naturally	and	intellectually	curious	about,	and	the	things	that	are	(regarded	as)	important	or	significant	for	them.	The	extent	to	which	we	value	and	praise	curiosity	cannot,	therefore,	be	explicable	in	terms	of	curiosity	moving	us	to	understand	intrinsically	important	truths.	Silvia	notes	that	“[e]xperiments	on	test	comprehension	…	suggest	that	interesting	and	important	sentences	are	processed	according	to	different	strategies	…	A	consequence	is	that	interesting	elements	may	be	remembered	better	than	important	elements	if	the	two	diverge.”24	In	addition,	experiments	on	motivation	indicate	that	importance	and	interest	are	not	necessarily	linked.	Increasing	the	importance	of	a	boring	task	does	not	necessarily	increase	how	interesting	someone	finds	it.	Instead,	people	stick	at	the	task	because	of	its	importance	and	employ	other	strategies	to	make	it	more	interesting.25		In	the	final	section	I’ll	explain	how	we	can	accommodate	the	idea	that	curiosity	is	to	be	esteemed,	and	yet	isn’t	a	response	to	intrinsically	valuable	or	significant	truths.	Curiosity	can	be	an	intrinsically	valuable	response	to	truth,	therefore,	even	if	there	are	no	intrinsically	good	reasons	to	get	the	truth	on	some	particular	subject	matter.					
																																																								24	Silvia	(2006),	p.	195.	25	Ibid.	
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3.		It	seems	to	me	that	the	best	way	to	make	progress	here	is	to	compare	curiosity	to	another	kind	of	mental	state	that	we	think	valuable,	and	yet	which	involves	a	desire	for	something	that	is	not	in	itself	valuable.	This	is	the	mental	state	of	pleasure.	In	order	to	see	this,	let	us	look	more	closely	at	the	question	of	what	pleasure	is.		Any	plausible	account	of	pleasure	will	have	to	capture	the	obvious	fact	that	we	can	experience	a	great	variety	of	pleasures.	These	might	include:	bodily	sensations	such	as	a	warm	bath,	or	a	loved	one’s	kiss,	or	a	deep	muscle	massage,	or	the	feel	of	a	woollen	jumper;	taste	sensations	such	as	spicy	food	or	a	good	red	wine,	hollandaise	sauce,	jelly	beans;	intellectual	satisfactions	such	as	completing	a	crossword	puzzle	or	an	elegant	move	in	chess,	an	interesting	seminar	question	or	a	breakthrough	in	a	philosophical	puzzle;	aesthetic	pleasures	of	awe,	wonder,	the	sublime;	emotional	pleasures	such	as	amusement	at	jokes,	the	feelings	of	companionship	when	out	drinking	with	friends,	a	sense	of	identity	with	and	pride	in	one’s	community	or	university	or	country,	the	thrill	of	anticipation	or	victory;	and	so	on.	There	are,	then,	at	the	very	least	identifiable	categories	of	bodily,	intellectual,	aesthetic,	and	emotional	pleasures.	Any	plausible	account	of	pleasure	will	also	have	to	explain	what	all	these	different	kinds	have	in	common,	in	virtue	of	which	they	count	as	pleasures,	and	in	virtue	of	which	they	are	intrinsically	valuable.	One	general	kind	of	answer	here	appeals	to	pleasure’s	phenomenology	or	felt	quality.	On	this	account,	pleasures	are	unified	in	virtue	of	having	a	distinctive	feeling	or	hedonic	tone	in	
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common.26	It	is	this	common	feeling	or	tone	which	makes	the	disparate	experiences	pleasurable,	and	which	is	the	source	of	their	value.	But	this	general	answer,	although	it	has	a	deal	of	intuitive	support,	ultimately	seems	mistaken.	On	the	one	hand,	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	any	distinctive	feeling	quality	that	is	common	to	all	of	the	above	experiences:	pride	in	my	university	is	just	so	very	different,	from	the	phenomenological	standpoint,	to	the	taste	sensation	of	a	nice	glass	of	pinot	noir,	or	a	beloved’s	kiss,	or	the	feeling	of	contentment.	Even	if	we	restrict	our	survey	to	so-called	bodily	pleasures,	the	very	great	variety	of	kinds	of	bodily	pleasure	tells	against	the	possibility	of	identifying	a	single	feeling	quality	that	is	present	and	recognizable	in	each.	Exhaustion	after	a	long	session	in	the	gym	feels	radically	different	from	a	lover’s	kiss;	and	the	bodily	pleasure	of	scratching	an	itch	seems	of	a	different	phenomenological	kind	to	the	pleasure	of	crisp	cotton	sheets.	The	idea	that	all	of	the	different	categories	of	pleasure	–	bodily,	intellectual,	emotional,	aesthetic	–	somehow	feel	the	same	seems	even	more	implausible	in	light	of	this.27		Hedonic	tone	views	ultimately	fare	no	better,	given	the	difficulties	in	explaining	what	it	is	for	some	sensation	to	be	hedonically	or	affectively	toned.	Thus	Shelley	Kagan	maintains	that	pleasantness	is	akin	to	loudness,	“dimension	on	which	sounds	vary”	rather	a	distinctive	sound	quality.	But	there	are	problems	in	understanding	pleasantness	in	this	way,	not	least	the	fact	that	loudness	does	seem	to	be	a	particular	and	distinctive	quality	or	kind	of	sound.	We	might,	for	instance,	list	‘loud	people’	alongside	‘weak	beer’	and	‘mauve	sofas’	in	our	list	of	
																																																								26	For	a	nice	overview	of	these	possibilities,	see	Aydede	(2014).	27	This	is	known	as	the	Heterogeneity	Problem	for	distinctive	feeling	accounts	of	pleasantness.	It	received	an	early	airing	from	Sidgwick	(1907/1981),	p.	127,	and	more	recently	by	(amongst	others)	Fred	Feldman	(2006),	p.	79.		
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pet	hates;	here	loudness	is	a	distinctive	quality	of	some	people.	Other	attempts	to	explain	hedonic	tone	–	such	as	Roger	Crisp’s	appeal	to	the	distinction	between	
determinates	and	determinables	–	are	thought	to	fare	no	better.28		In	light	of	this,	many	philosophers	propose	that	we	switch	to	an	‘attitudinal’	account	of	pleasure.	On	this	approach,	pleasures	share	no	distinctive	feeling	quality	or	affective	tone,	but	instead	are	unified	in	virtue	of	a	shared	attitude.	Traditionally,	this	has	been	held	to	be	one	of	desire	or	liking.	Thus	Thomas	Carson,	defends	“the	view	that	the	pleasantness	…	of	an	experience	is	a	function	of	one’s	desires	with	respect	to	it	qua	feeling.”29	Richard	Brandt	claims	that	“for	an	experience	to	be	pleasant	is	for	it	to	make	the	person	want	its	continuation”.30	And	William	Alston	presents	a	similar	view:	“to	get	pleasure	is	to	have	an	experience	which,	as	of	the	moment,	one	would	rather	have	than	not	have,	on	the	basis	of	its	felt	quality,	apart	from	any	further	considerations	regarding	consequences.”31	So	attitudinal	accounts	maintain	that	pleasures	actually	consist	of	two	elements:	one	is	a	sensation,	which	in	very	many	cases	
does	have	a	distinctive	feel.	Thus	the	sensation	of	warm	sun	on	one’s	body	is	distinct	from	the	sensation	of	a	cold	beer,	which	is	distinct	from	the	sensation	of	answering	a	philosophical	puzzle,	and	so	on.	The	second	element	is	one	of	desire	or	liking	that	is	directed	towards	this	sensation.	So	pleasant	experiences	consist	of	sensations	that	we	desire	or	like.	In	more	sophisticated	terms,	“a	sensation	S,	occurring	at	time	t,	is	a	sensory	pleasure	at	t	iff	the	subject	of	S	desires,	intrinsically	and	de	re,	at	t,	of	S,	that	it	be	occurring	at	t.”32																																																									28	For	a	trenchant	criticism	of	Crisp’s	proposal,	see	Bramble	(2013).		29	Carson	(2000),	p.	13.	30	Brandt	(1979),	p.	38.	31	Alston	(1967),	p.	345.	32	Heathwood	(2007),	p.	32.		
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If	the	attitudinal	theory	of	pleasure	is	correct,	then	pleasure	is	valuable	
because	it	consists	in	a	sensation	that	the	subject	likes	or	wants	to	occur.	What	is	intrinsically	valuable	is	thus	the	relational	state	of	desiring	that	some	sensation	occur.	But	since	it	is	the	relation	that	is	valuable,	rather	than	any	distinctive	feature	of	the	sensation	that	the	subject	desires	–	a	feature	or	quality	that	is	common	to	all	pleasures	and	which	(on	the	phenomenological	account)	makes	them	valuable	–	then	the	desires	or	likings	that	partly	constitute	pleasures	are	not	themselves	directed	at	anything	of	intrinsic	value.	In	other	words,	there	is	nothing	intrinsically	good	about	the	sensations	that	would	merit	or	warrant	the	relevant	desires	on	the	subject’s	part.	We	desire	that	some	sensations	occur,	but	not	for	features	of	those	sensations	that	constitute	reasons	to	so	desire.	Here	is	how	Derek	Parfit	makes	the	point,	in	terms	of	liking:	“When	we	want	something,	we	are	often	responding	to	the	features	of	this	thing	that	give	us	reasons	to	want	it.	But	we	have	some	desire-like	states	that	are	not,	in	this	way,	responses	to	reasons.	Three	examples	are	the	instinctive	states	of	hunger,	thirst	and	lust.	Another	important	set	of	mental	states,	though	they	are	often	assumed	to	be	desires,	are	better	regarded	as	being	in	a	separate	category.	These	are	the	
hedonic	likings	and	dislikings	of	certain	actual	present	sensations	that	make	our	having	these	sensations	pleasant,	painful,	or	in	other	ways	unpleasant,	or	in	which	their	pleasantness	or	unpleasantness	consists.”33	Nevertheless	–	and	to	repeat	–	our	liking	or	desiring	the	sensations	in	question	constitutes	an	intrinsically	valuable	relational	state,	and	one	that	we	have	reason	to	pursue.	Now	there	is,	of	course,	a	story	to	be	hold	as	to	why	human	beings	have	developed	to	like	a	particular	range	of	sensations,	even	if	those	sensations	are																																																									33	Parfit,	D.	(2011)	pp.	52-3.	
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not	themselves	intrinsically	valuable,	and	hence	even	if	there	is	no	feature	of	the	sensations	in	question	that	constitutes	a	recognizable	reason	to	desire	them.	Clearly	the	story	here	will	be	that	the	relevant	sensations	are	in	some	way	connected	to	what	is	beneficial	for	the	agent,	although	the	connection	here	must	be	loose	enough	to	allow	a	great	deal	of	divergence	and	dissociation	between	what	people	find	pleasurable	and	what	is	beneficial	for	them.	Thus,	sensations	associated	with	bodily	and	emotional	pleasures	will	be	sensations	that	are	(more	or	less	reliably)	associated	with	or	generated	by	objects	and	events	that	enhance	our	well-being,	whilst	sensations	associated	with	bodily	and	emotional	suffering	will	be	sensations	that	are	(more	or	less	reliably)	associated	with	things	that	threaten	or	damage	our	welfare.	But	the	fact	that	such	sensations	are	so	related	to	what	enhances	or	detracts	from	well-being	is	often	and	perhaps	nearly	always	hidden	to	us.	This	fact	is	not	therefore	our	reason	for	so	desiring.	The	linkage	or	connection	between	sensations	and	well-being	is	for	the	most	part	a	sub-personal	matter,	as	as	indicated	by	the	fact	that	creatures	lacking	the	capacity	for	reflective	thought	can	nevertheless	experience	pleasure	and	pain,	and	the	fact	that	even	reflective	creatures	typically	lack	awareness	of	why	we	like	the	bodily	sensations	associated	with	fatty	foods,	or	itches	being	scratched,	or	being	kissed.	As	a	result,	it	makes	sense	for	us,	from	the	standpoint	of	systemic	functioning,	to	like	or	desire	that	certain	sensations	are	occurring,	even	though	there	are	no	intrinsic	features	of	the	sensations	that	constitute	reasons	to	like	or	desire	them,	and	(not	unrelatedly)	even	if	we	have	no	good	idea	of	why	we	like	or	desire	that	the	sensations	be	occurring.		It	seems	to	me	that	pleasure	provides	a	model	for	how	we	should	understand	the	intrinsic	value	of	curiosity,	in	a	way	that	acknowledges	the	fact	
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that	curiosity	does	not	seem	to	be	directed	at	anything	of	particular	value.	As	we	saw	in	previous	sections,	curiosity	varies	with	novelty	and	coping	potential,	but	not	with	the	importance	or	significance	of	subjects	and	questions.	As	a	result,	we	cannot	identify	any	distinctive	valuable	quality	that	unifies	all	of	the	very	many	things	that	we	desire	to	know	about	and	want	to	understand.	The	objects	of	our	curiosity	have	nothing	valuable	in	common,	therefore,	which	could	intrinsically	merit	or	make	appropriate	the	interest	we	take	in	them.	Nevertheless,	although		the	objects	and	questions	that	trigger	our	curiosity	have	nothing	valuable	in	common,	they	are	unified	by	the	very	fact	that	we	are	curious	about	them.	This	suggests	that	what	is	valuable	isn’t	some	distinctive	and	identifiable	feature	that	the	truth	on	subjects	that	trigger	our	curiosity	has	in	common;	instead,	what	is	valuable	is	the	relational	state	of	being	curious	about	some	novel	topic	or	understandable	issue.	It	is	the	desire	to	know	that	unifies	all	instances	of	curiosity,	just	as	it	is	the	desire	that	a	sensation	be	occurring	that	unifies	all	instances	of	pleasure.	Moreover,	just	as	there	is	no	incompatibility	between	pleasure	being	relational	and	intrinsically	valuable,	there	should	be	no	obvious	problem	with	thinking	the	same	about	curiosity:	it	is	intrinsically	valuable	for	us	to	be	curious	about	the	truth	on	some	subject,	even	if	we	cannot	identify	any	feature	or	quality	of	the	relevant	truth	that	would	warrant	the	desire	to	know.		Now	there	is	of	course	a	further	story	to	be	told	here	about	why	human	beings	have	developed	so	that	curiosity	varies	along	the	appraisal	variables	of	novelty	and	coping	potential,	even	if	those	variables	are	not	themselves	intrinsically	valuable,	and	hence	even	if	there	is	no	feature	of	the	the	relevant	subjects	that	constitutes	a	recognizable	reason	to	desire	know	the	truth	about	them.	This	will	presumably	be	a	story	that	highlights	the	epistemic	and	practical	
	 20	
pay-offs	of	curiosity	having	the	appraisal	variables	that	it	does:	about	us	being	curious	about	or	interested	in	the	unexpected,	the	novel,	the	complex,	the	mysterious,	and	about	this	curiosity	being	tempered	by	our	assessment	of	our	capacity	to	understand.	The	general	story	here	will,	I	assume,	take	the	form	of	showing	how	we	are	better	off	to	the	extent	that	we	amass	a	wide	range	of	knowledge	and	understanding,	consistent	with	the	costs	of	acquisition,	and	that	this	will	only	happen	if	we	have	a	general	attraction	to	the	novel	and	mysterious	and	complex.	So	we	need	to	increase	our	set	of	useful	beliefs,	in	a	way	that	the	new	acquisitions	are	sufficiently	unlike	our	current	set	(otherwise	why	waste	efforts	to	acquire	them),	but	also	need	to	balance	the	benefits	of	acquisition	with	the	potential	costs	(which	is	why	we	don’t	pursue	understanding	of	things	that	would	take	up	significant	cognitive	resources).	So	the	first	appraisal	variable	directs	us	to	knowledge	which	is,	because	an	extension	of	what	we	know,	of	potential	use;	and	the	second	appraisal	variable	limits	the	amount	of	cognitive	resources	we	expand	on	getting	such	information	and	knowledge.	But	the	fact	that	the	objects	of	our	curiosity	are	so	related	to	the	need	for	useful	and	cognitively	affordable	truths	will	be	often	and	perhaps	nearly	always	hidden	to	us,	and	so	will	not	constitute	our	reason	for	desiring	to	know	the	truths	on	the	relevant	subjects.	The	linkage	or	connection	between	what	we	want	to	know	about,	and	what	is	useful	and	affordable,	will	be	for	the	most	part	a	sub-personal	matter.	As	a	result,	it	makes	sense	for	us,	from	the	standpoint	of	systemic	functioning,	to	desire	to	know	what	is	novel	and	understandable,	even	though	there	are	no	intrinsic	features	of	the	truths	in	question	that	constitute	intrinsic	reasons	to	want	to	know	them,	and	(not	unrelatedly)	even	if	we	have	no	good	idea	of	why	we	want	to	know	truths	like	that,	beyond	the	fact	that	we	do.		
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	It	seems	to	me,	therefore,	that	there	is	no	inconsistency	in	maintaining	that	curiosity	is	both	intrinsically	valuable,	and	that	it	is	constituted	by	a	desire	for	truths	that	are	not	themselves	distinctively	valuable.	It	nevertheless	makes	sense	for	us	to	be	curious	about	novel	and	understandable	truths,	given	the	(more	or	less)	reliable	connection	between	such	truths	and	epistemic	and	practical	benefits.	Support	for	both	of	these	claims	comes,	I	have	argued,	from	an	analogy	between	curiosity	and	pleasure.	For	pleasure	too	is	intrinsically	valuable,	but	constituted	by	a	desire	for	sensations	that	are	not	themselves	distinctively	valuable	either.	It	nevertheless	makes	sense	for	us	to	desire	that	such	sensations	occur,	given	the	(more	or	less)	reliable	connection	between	such	sensations	and	our	general	welfare.	If	we	model	curiosity	on	pleasure,	therefore,	we	avoid	what	might	appear	to	be	a	significant	problem	in	understanding	why	curiosity	enjoys	the	esteem	that	it	does.					
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